Protection against the man-in-the-middle-attack for the
  Kirchhoff-loop-Johnson(-like)-noise cipher and expansion by voltage-based
  security by Kish, Laszlo B.
PROTECTION AGAINST THE MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE-ATTACK FOR THE
KIRCHHOFF-LOOP-JOHNSON(-LIKE)-NOISE CIPHER AND EXPANSION BY
VOLTAGE-BASED SECURITY 1
L. B. KISH
Department of Electrical Engineering, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX
77843-3128, USA
ABSTRACT. It is shown that the original Kirchhoff-loop-Johnson(-like)-noise (KLJN)
cipher is naturally protected against the man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack, if the
eavesdropper is using resistors and noise voltage generators just like the sender and the
receiver. The eavesdropper can extract zero bit of information before she is discovered.
However, when the eavesdropper is using noise current generators, though the cipher is
protected, the eavesdropper may still be able to extract one bit of information while she is
discovered. For enhanced security, we expand the KLJN cipher with the comparison of
the instantaneous voltages via the public channel. In this way, the sender and receiver has
a full control over the security of measurable physical quantities in the Kirchhoff-loop.
We show that when the sender and receiver compare not only their instantaneous current
data but also their instantaneous voltage data then the zero-bit security holds even for the
noise current generator case. We show that the original KLJN scheme is also zero-bit
protected against that type of MITM attack when the eavesdropper uses voltage noise
generators, only. In conclusion, within the idealized model scheme, the man-in-the-
middle-attack does not provide any advantage compared to the regular attack considered
earlier. The remaining possibility is the attack by a short, large current pulse, which
described in the original paper as the only efficient type of regular attacks, and that yields
the one bit security. In conclusion, the KLJN cipher is superior to known quantum
communication schemes in every respect, including speed, robustness, maintenance need,
price and its natural immunity against the man-in-the-middle attack.
Keywords: Totally secure communication without quantum; man in the middle attack;
stealth communication; noise.
1. Introduction: totally secure communication without quantum information with
Kirchhoff-loop and Johnson(-like) noise
Recently, a totally secure classical communication scheme was introduced [1,2] utilizing
two pairs of resistors and noise voltage generators, the physical properties of an idealized
Kirchhoff-loop and the statistical physical properties thermal noise. In the idealized
scheme of the Kirchhoff-loop-Johnson-(like)-noise (KLJN) cipher, the passively
observing eavesdropper can extract zero bit of information. The intrusive eavesdropper,
who emits a large and short current pulse in the channel, can extract only one bit of
information while she is getting discovered [1] because the sender and the receiver are
measuring their instantaneous current amplitudes and compare them via a public channel
(like non-jamable radio transmission). The issue of the man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack
was not studied in the original paper because of the author's earlier belief that no core
physical secure layer is protected against such an attack and any security against the
MITM attack has to be provided by additional (mainly software) tools, signatures, trusted
third party, etc.
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In this paper, it is shown that the originally proposed KLJN scheme [1] is naturally
protected against the MITM attack. Moreover, we propose an easy enhancement of the
original security by the exchange and comparison of not only the instantaneous current
amplitudes but also the instantaneous voltage amplitudes. This step further enhances the
security against the MITM attack and it can be beneficial against other types of attacks of
any practical realizations.
2. General clarifications about the issue of security of physical secure layers
In secure communication, any one of the following cases implies absolute security,
however the relevant cases for physical secure layers are points 3 and 4:
1. The eavesdropper cannot physically access the information channel.
2. The sender and the receiver have a shared secret key for the communication.
3. The eavesdropper has access and can execute measurements on the channel but the
laws of physics do not allow extracting the communicated information from the
measurement data.
4. The eavesdropper can extract the communicated information however, when that
happens, it disturbs the channel so that the sender and receiver discover the
eavesdropping activity.
Keeping points 3 and 4 in mind, we can classify the focus topics of research of physical
secure layers as follows:
i) Absolute security of the idealized situation. This is the most fundamental scientific part
of the research and the mathematical model of the idealized physical system is developed
and tested. The basic question is that how much information can be extracted from the
data by the physical measurements allowed in the idealized situation? The original paper
and the present study aim the investigation of this question.
ii) Absolute security of the practical situation. This part of the research requires an
interdisciplinary effort including the fields of physics, engineering and data security.
Because no real system can totally match the physical properties of the ideal
mathematical model system, this kind of absolute security does not exist in reality; it is
rather approached by an only practically absolute security. For example, in quantum
communication, we have no ideal single photon source, no noise-free channel, and no
noise-free detectors, and any of these deficiencies compromise absolute security.
Similarly, with the KLJN cipher, cable resistance [3] and cable capacitance can cause
information leak because the eavesdropper can execute measurements along the cable.
This effect can be controlled and minimized by the particular design and choosing proper
driving resistances and noise bandwidth that prohibit to make an acceptable statistics
about the deviation of the noise strength along the cable within the clock period.
Similarly, fast switching of the resistors can violate the no-wave bandwidth rule
described in [1] (Eq. 9) but this problem can be avoided by using slow switches and/or
filters at the line input.
iii) If the code is broken, how many bits can be extracted by the eavesdropper before she
is discovered due to the disturbance of the channel? This question can also be treated at
both the idealized-fundamental level and at the practical one. Some answers for the
idealized case: RSA: infinite number of bits; Quantum: 20 - 10000 bits; KLJN cipher: 1
bit.
3In the rest of the paper, we strictly focus on question i) while we are discussing the
MITM attack in terms of point 4 above.
3. Security of the KLJN cipher against the man-in-the-middle attack and
expanding the system with voltage based security
In this section we show that the original KLJN cipher arrangement [1] is secure against
the MITM attack. The goal is to study the idealized model and show that the
eavesdropper is discovered when she executes the attack. Finally, we propose a simple
expansion of the scheme by comparing the voltage data, too, for enhanced security.
Figure 1. Man-in-the-middle-attack by using resistors with the same values and noise voltage generators with
the same parameters as those of the sender and the receiver.
Figure 1 shows the MITM attack by using resistors with the same values and noise
voltage generators with the same parameters as those of the sender and the receiver. The
eavesdropper breaks the line at the middle and installs two KLJN communicators, one for
the sender and another one for the receiver. According to the original scheme, the
instantaneous current amplitudes, at the sender's end and at the receiver's end, are
compared via a public channel. Because the eavesdropper's noise generators are different
representations of the corresponding stochastic processes, their instantaneous amplitudes
are different from those of the sender's and the receiver's noise generators. Therefore, the
current amplitudes are different in the two loops and the eavesdropper is discovered
within the reciprocal of the bandwidth, within the time resolution of the communicated
noise, before extracting a single bit of information. We remind the reader [1] that the
extraction of information from noise needs the making of a (short range) statistics
through an averaging time window, which is the clock period, thus a single time (noise)
sample provides zero information.
Mathematically, we can write as follows. Let   i œ 0,1  ;  m œ 0,1 ;  kœ0,1 ;  pœ0,1 .
Then all the following voltages Ui, S (t), Um,E (t) , Uk ,R(t)  and Up,E (t), see Figure 1, are
statistically independent Gaussian stochastic processes with zero mean. The current at the
sender's end and the receiver's end can be written as
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IS,Ch (t) =
Ui,S (t) -Um,E (t)
Ri + Rm
          and            
  
IR,Ch (t) =
Uk ,R(t) -Up,E (t)
Rk + Rp
 ,            (1)
respectively. As the most pessimistic case, let us suppose that the denominators are equal
and the nominators also contain the same type of noise generators, for example,   i = k  and
  m = p . Then the RMS value of IS,Ch (t)  and that of IR,Ch (t)  are equal. Then the
probability P0   that   IS,Ch (t0 ) = IR,Ch (t0 ) at a given time moment t0  is roughly equal to
the ratio of the amplitude resolution   D  of the measurement system and the RMS value of
these currents:
  
P0 º
D
IRMS
         (2)
Let us suppose 7 bits resolution of the measurement (a pessimistic value), then
  P0 = 1/128, which is less than 1% chance of staying hidden. On the other hand, P0  is the
probability that the eavesdropper can stay hidden during the correlation time   t  of the
noise, where   t  is roughly the inverse of the noise bandwidth. Because the KLJN cipher
works with statistics made on noise, the actual clock period T  is   N >> 1 times longer
than the correlation time of the noise used [1]. Thus, during the clock period, the
probability of staying hidden is:
  Pclock = P0
N
         (3)
Supposing a practical   T = 10t  (see [1]) the probability at the other example  P < 10-20 .
This is the estimated probability that, in the given system the eavesdropper can extract a
single bit without getting discovered. The probability that she can stay hidden while
extracting 2 bits is   P < 10-40 , for 3 bits it is   P < 10-60 , etc. In conclusion, we can safely
say that the eavesdropper is discovered immediately before she can extract a single bit of
information. The probability of staying hidden can be estimated in the same manner in
the rest of this paper, however we skip these calculations because of their trivial nature,
and the straightforward considerations below.
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Figure 2. Man-in-the-middle-attack by using twin noise current generators with the same instantaneous current
amplitudes.
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current amplitudes at the two sides, a natural question arises. Can we provide security
when the eavesdropper executes the MITM attack by using two noise current generators
with the same instantaneous current amplitudes and RMS values imitating a reasonable
noise current in the channel? Figure 2 shows the MITM attack by using twin noise
current generators with the same instantaneous current amplitudes. In this case, the
equality of the current amplitudes at the two sides is guaranteed by the twin noise current
generators, therefore comparing the current amplitudes cannot be used for protection. For
the best protection, we can expand the original KLJN cipher [1] by a voltage-based
security enhancement. The sender and the receiver can compare the instantaneous voltage
amplitudes at their end, via a public channel. Because the sender's noise generator and
receiver's one have either different parameters or they are different representations of the
same stochastic processes, their instantaneous amplitudes are different at most of the
time. Therefore, the voltage amplitudes are different at the two ends and the eavesdropper
is discovered practically immediately, before extracting a single bit of information.
However, it is important to note that the original scheme is also secure against this
last kind of attack though not at the zero-bit security level but at the one-bit level.
Normally the power density spectrum Su,Ch ( f )  of the voltage noise in the channel is
smaller than that of the actual noise voltage generator Su ( f )  of the sender and the
receiver, respectively, because it is proportional to the parallel resultant of those
resistances:
  
Su,Ch ( f ) < Su ( f )          (4)
However, during the MITM attack shown in Figure 2, the following relations hold:
  
Su,Ch ( f ) = Su ( f ) + R2Si,E ( f )     therefore     Su,Ch ( f ) > Su ( f )  .          (5)
That means, the MITM attack will be discovered after the sufficient statistics is made on
the spectrum during the clock period. During the communication of the secure bit, the
side using the larger resistor will discover the attack faster. At the same time, the
eavesdropper, while getting discovered, can extract one bit of information. Thus, the
expansion by the voltage-based security measure described above provides an enhanced
security.
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Figure 3. Man-in-the-middle-attack by using twin noise voltage generators with the same instantaneous current
amplitudes.
 L.B. Kish
6
Because the defense described in the context of Figure 2 is based on the difference of
the voltages at the two sides, a natural question arises. Can we provide security when the
eavesdropper executes the MITM attack by using two noise voltage generators with the
same instantaneous voltage amplitudes and RMS values imitating a reasonable noise
voltage in the channel? Figure 3 shows the man-in-the-middle-attack by using twin noise
voltage generators with the same instantaneous current amplitudes. In this case, the twin
noise voltage generators guarantee the equality of the instantaneous voltage amplitudes at
the two sides. Therefore comparing the voltage amplitudes cannot be used for protection.
For the protection, the sender and the receiver can compare the instantaneous current
amplitudes, via a public channel. Because the sender's noise generator and receiver's one
have either different parameters or they are different representations of the same
stochastic processes, their instantaneous amplitudes are different. Therefore the current
amplitudes are different in the two loops and the eavesdropper is discovered immediately,
before extracting a single bit of information.
4. Conclusion
The KLJN cipher with public channel for comparing currents [1] is naturally
protected against the MITM attack and the eavesdropper is discovered with a very high
probability while or before she can extract a single bit. Enhanced security can be reached
by comparing the voltages and then the eavesdropper is discovered with a very high
probability before she can extract a single bit of information. Thus within the idealized
model scheme, the man-in-the-middle-attack does not provide any advantage compared
to the regular attack considered earlier. The remaining possibility is the attack by a short,
large current pulse, which described in the original paper [1] as the only efficient type of
regular attacks, and that yields the one bit security.
Therefore, the KLJN cipher is superior to known quantum communication schemes in
every respect, including speed, robustness, maintenance need, price and its natural
immunity against the man-in-the-middle attack.
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